INTRODUCTION

1.
Investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms embodied in most investment treaties provide rights to foreign investors to seek redress for damages arising out of alleged breaches by host governments of investment-related obligations. The system of investment dispute settlement has borrowed its main elements from the system of commercial arbitration despite the fact that investor-state disputes often raise public interest issues which are usually absent from international commercial arbitration. Investor-state arbitration may often call for reconciliation of public international law doctrines with the private legal principles of contract law. This hybrid source of rights is generating new questions and in particular challenges relating to the quality of awards and jurisdictional issues.
2.
Investment arbitration has expanded in the past decade thanks in part to the more than 2300 BITs now in force around the world as well as the recently concluded Free Trade Agreements, the NAFTA and other regional and multilateral investment treaties such as the Energy Charter Treaty. As the number of investment agreements has risen, the cases brought to dispute settlement have become increasingly complex too, encompassing multiple contracts and hence multiple parties and issues. The multiplication of investment agreements with investor-state dispute settlement provisions has raised the risk of multiple and conflicting awards, as the same dispute can lead to awards under different treaty regimes, as well as under different contracts. The more options parties have to resolve their international disputes in different fora, the greater the risk of multiple and conflicting awards.
3.
Although the experience up to now does not show major inconsistencies among arbitral awards, addressing cross-cutting provisions, some decisions considered inconsistent by certain parties and the evolving landscape in investment arbitration led to discussions within the OECD Investment Committee as well as in the context of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) on the possibility of the creation of an appeal mechanism. Discussions on establishing an appeal mechanism were not conclusive at this stage but some ideas emerged for the improvement of the system, in particular by enhancing the uniformity in the review process. Although strengthening of transparency was one of the main measures proposed for the improvement of the system, it will not be discussed in this note since it has been the subject of a stand alone, detailed survey 1 and a public statement by the OECD Investment Committee.
4.
The present paper i) deals with issues related to the quality of arbitral awards; ii) examines issues related to multiple and parallel proceedings and explores the merits of consolidation of claims; and iii) deals with challenges of jurisdictional nature. In this examination of issues, some proposals were made for possible improvement of the system of investment arbitration. 
I. DEALING WITH ISSUES OF QUALITY OF AWARDS
5.
There are a number of procedures addressing the quality of arbitral awards. The main procedure for challenging an award is the procedure to review or set aside the final award. The review, which is different for ICSID Convention and non-ICSID Convention awards, is based on limited grounds and does not have as broad a potential scope as an appeal.
6.
Another procedure used to help assure the quality of awards is the independent "scrutiny" of draft awards, before they are final, which is a unique feature of the International Court of Arbitration. It does not correspond to a review but constitutes an additional layer of quality control. It currently applies only to disputes brought under the International Chamber of Commerce, which include also a limited number of investment disputes.
7.
This section describes the current system of review for both ICSID and non-ICSID awards, including the discussion on the feasibility of a proposal to create an Additional Annulment Facility in the context of ICSID; summarises the discussion on the feasibility of an appeal mechanism and explores the possibility of the application of the "scrutiny" procedure to investment arbitration outside the ICC.
I.1.
Review of awards: the current system and a proposal
8.
Review of arbitral awards is designed to preserve the interests of the Parties. Where a defeated Party is dissatisfied with the arbitral Tribunal's award, it may seek to set it aside. The possibilities of challenging the award differ according to the system of arbitration chosen by the Parties, institutional or ad hoc. Although the ICSID Convention system prevents domestic courts from reviewing any of its decisions, recourse to any other kind of arbitration gives a prominent role to national courts which may have a local bias or be subject to the influence of the host government.
A.
The ICSID Convention Arbitration
9.
The ICSID Convention mechanism is self-contained, providing for internal control which includes provisions on the interpretation, revision and annulment of awards. These provisions allow either Party to request a review of the award of an ICSID Tribunal when:
• The dispute concerns the meaning or scope of the award (interpretation of awards by the same or a new tribunal, Article 50 of the Convention).
• New facts have emerged which may affect the award decisively and were unknown to the tribunal and to the party seeking to introduce these facts; the latter's ignorance was not due to negligence (revision of awards by the same or a new tribunal, Article 51 of the ICSID Convention). The new elements must be ones of fact and not law and the facts must be of such a nature that they would have led to a different decision had they been known to the tribunal. 
11.
The decisions rendered by the ad hoc Annulment Committees have usually involved the same grounds: manifest excess of powers, serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure and failure to state reasons. Despite the criticisms of this procedure after the first few cases, the system seems currently to work well and to meet the satisfaction of most arbitrators and clients.
12.
Annulment is different than appeal. This is apparent from Article 53 which provides that the award shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in the Convention. Moreover, it does not extend beyond the closed list of grounds to errors on the merits, i.e. errors of law or fact in the award. The result of a successful annulment procedure is the invalidation of the original decision; in contrast, an appeal may result in the modification of the decision. 11 In theory, an appellate body could substitute its own decision for that of the first tribunal or require that tribunal to rectify its mistakes.
B.
Non-ICSID Convention arbitration
13.
Where arbitration is not conducted under the ICSID Convention, awards or their enforcement can be challenged under the commercial arbitration framework established by national law, the New York Convention and other relevant treaties. Therefore, the national law at the place of arbitration controls the losing party's request to set aside the award, or as the case may be, to refuse enforcement.
14.
National arbitration laws prescribe various grounds on which arbitration awards can be challenged. Most modern arbitration statutes provide a limited list of grounds for review and many follow the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration which generally track the list of grounds for non-enforcement of awards contained in Article V of the New York Convention: 1) incapacity of the parties to enter into the arbitration agreement or invalidity of the arbitration agreement; 2) lack of proper notice to a party or incapacity to present its case; 3) inclusion in the award of matters outside the scope of submission; 4) irregularities in the composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure; 5) non-arbitrability of the subject matter and 6) violation of domestic public policy.
15.
In practice, the most common grounds found by the courts as a reason for set-aside or nonenforcement, are that arbitrators had decided issues outside the scope of their authority or that the award violates public policy. 12 
16.
In most countries, the grounds for vacating arbitral awards are mandatory: the parties cannot contract around them. In some countries however, the grounds for vacating international arbitration awards are default rules, at least for arbitrations involving foreign parties. 12. See N. Rubins "Judicial Review of Investment Arbitration Awards" NAFTA Investment Law and Arbitration, Todd Weiler, Editor p. 363. Rubins states that "…non-arbitrability of the subject matter and procedural irregularity are grounds for challenge that have yet to appear prominently in cases related to investment arbitration awards but which could find increasing currency should challenges become more common".
13.
For example, the Swiss international arbitration law provides: "where none of the parties has its domicile, its habitual residence or a business establishment in Switzerland, they may, by an express statement in the arbitration agreement or by a subsequent agreement in writing, exclude all setting aside proceedings, or they may limit such proceedings to one or several of the grounds listed…", Swiss Private International Law Act, Art. 192(1) (December 18, 1987) .
17.
However, an award set aside or vacated at the place of arbitration could be enforceable under other jurisdictions. Because the New York Convention exception to enforcement based on set aside or vacatur at the place of arbitration is worded permissively, some courts have enforced awards that were set aside in foreign courts. 14 18.
While most countries have implemented legislation that limits the grounds on which an award may be set aside, the opportunity remains in some cases to reopen the merits of the case, either by application of a broad arbitration statute or broad interpretation of a narrow one.
15
C.
An Additional Annulment Facility: a proposal
19.
As mentioned above, the self-contained ICSID mechanism provides for Annulment of ICSID awards by ad hoc Annulment Committees. This mechanism applies however, only to ICSID awards between Washington Convention Parties (142 today). Any revision of a non-ICSID award, e.g., an award under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules or under the UNCITRAL Rules, is in the hands of national courts under national arbitration laws and the New York Convention provisions.
20.
For countries which are not Parties to the Washington Convention, ICSID provides for Additional Facility Rules which authorise the Secretariat of ICSID to administer certain categories of proceedings between States and nationals of other States that fall outside the scope of the ICSID Convention. These are (i) fact-finding proceedings; (ii) conciliation or arbitration proceedings for the settlement of investment disputes between parties one of which is not a Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State; and (iii) conciliation and arbitration proceedings between parties at least one of which is a Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State for the settlement of disputes that do not arise directly out of an investment, provided that the underlying transaction is not an ordinary commercial transaction. These Rules have been adopted by the Administrative Council.
21.
By adopting and applying these Additional Facility Rules, ICSID has created a certain form of uniformity at least in the administration of disputes handled by the Centre. One proposal would be to extend this uniformity at the review level by creating an Additional Annulment Facility that could be used as an adjunct to whatever arbitration rules are applicable. 16 
22.
By doing so, non-ICSID members would also have access to the self-contained ICSID system of Annulment and any request for review would be submitted to an ad hoc Annulment Committee instead of national courts. Hence, it may limit the number of cases submitted for review to national courts and could serve one of the main purposes of investment arbitration: investor-State disputes would 14.
For instance, France does not consider set aside abroad when deciding to grant or refuse recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award; this approach emphasises the parties' agreement by focusing on the arbitration award; 
23.
This proposal has been seen as an interesting way to achieve some of the quality control sought by the proponents of an appeals mechanism, though with considerably narrower scope. It remains however an open question whether creation of such an Additional Annulment Facility could be accomplished simply by the drafting of rules that would be adopted by ICSID's Administrative Council. It would also need to be examined whether an arbitral award under such rules be effectively shielded from set-aside or annulment procedures under the arbitral law of the seat of the arbitration without some provision being made in the domestic arbitration law, e.g. pursuant to a treaty.
24.
This proposal raises a number of other questions. What would be the case for example of awards issued under NAFTA which in its Article 1136 explicitly contemplates set aside proceedings under domestic law? Could the Additional Annulment Facility be made the exclusive annulment option for arbitration under the Additional Facility Rules and if so, would this be only with regard to future consent to arbitration under these Rules or should the possibility be explored of extending it to existing consents? An option would be the drafting of an optional set of rules requiring other statutory, treaty-or contractual based demonstrations of consent.
25.
Members of the Investment Committee discussed this proposal and considered that, because of all the questions rose above as well as the limited need for reforming the existing system this was not, at this stage, a desirable improvement measure.
I.2.
The discussion on an appeals mechanism
26.
One of the advantages of investment arbitration for foreign investors are that investor-State disputes are resolved by means of mechanisms governed by international standards and procedures and do not rely on standards of the host State and the domestic courts. The finality of arbitration proceedings, i.e., that an arbitration award is binding and not subject to appeal on the merits, has generally been seen as an advantage over judicial settlement.
27.
There is a view, however, that though finality is one of the main advantages of international arbitration -for the savings it brings in costs and time -it may sometime come at the risk of having to live with flawed or inconsistent awards on the same or very similar questions or facts. Discussion on the possibility of appeal for investment disputes started among scholars as far back as the early 90s 17 while the first discussion at the governmental level took place during the MAI negotiations.
18 Some countries As a result, governments and legal experts have debated its possible advantages and disadvantages in investor-state arbitration. The OECD Investment Committee and ICSID held a joint meeting of legal experts in order to get the reaction of arbitrators on this issue. The discussions focused on i) developments with respect to the creation of an appeal mechanism and the possible consequences, if any, for the OECD member countries and ii) the rationale for creating such a mechanism, i.e. its advantages and disadvantages.
A.
Developments regarding an appeal mechanism in new investment agreements and their possible consequences
29.
The US Trade Act of 2002, which granted trade promotion authority to the Executive Branch of the US Government 20 and has been the basis for the conclusion of several recent US Free Trade Agreements, set down a number of objectives with respect to foreign investment. 21 These included a negotiating objective of an appellate mechanism for investment disputes under free trade agreements:
22
"…providing for an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of investment provisions in trade agreements…"
30.
As a result of this Act, the following specific language on an appellate mechanism was inserted in the recent US Free Trade Agreements with Chile, 23 
32.
Any future decisions by the parties to such agreements to establish such an appellate body or similar mechanism would mean in practice the creation of an ad hoc appeal tribunal under each such treaty. Alternatively, one single, preferably institutionally-managed and widely-accepted appeals mechanism could be created. Concerned with a risk of fragmentation of the dispute settlement system that could ensue under the first scenario and may itself affect the consistency of law, ICSID had offered some ideas on the creation of an optional ICSID Appeals Facility, established and operated under a set of Appeals Facility Rules.
33.
It is possible that some appeal mechanism on investment disputes may become operational within a short period of time. Although only a few countries are currently addressing the idea of an appellate mechanism in their agreements, their actions may have implications for others. Such implications may increase if an appellate mechanism becomes a reality and begins to issue decisions. The decisions of such an appeal body would have legal implications and an influence on the traditional case law; they could create precedents. There could be perceptions that these are higher level tribunals whose decisions should have a higher precedential value, although in essence they will be issued from the same legal community as the first instance arbitral tribunals. They could also have political implications, since the availability of such a mechanism in some countries could encourage constituencies in other countries to ask forcefully for such a mechanism in their own agreements.
34.
There has been also a concern that certain Most Favoured Nation clauses might bring an appeal mechanism into play under treaties that had not envisaged appeal. The parties to existing and new BITs will therefore need to consider the potential interaction between their investment agreements and any future appellate mechanism to which they may decide to subscribe.
35.
The experts consulted were overwhelmingly of the view that, even though they were not all convinced of the objective necessity of an appeals mechanism for investor-state awards, if some countries were ready to establish one, it would be better by far to have a single mechanism.
B.
Why an appeal mechanism in investment disputes? Advantages and disadvantages
36.
There was a vivid discussion among the legal community over the advantages and disadvantages of an appellate mechanism. It is however difficult to dissociate the rationale for appeal from the approach to be taken vis-à-vis the specific modalities of such an appeal mechanism.
i) Advantages
37.
The main advantages put forward in discussions were consistency, the possibility of rectification of legal errors and, possibly serious errors of fact, the fact that the review would be confined to a neutral tribunal instead of national courts and that it would enhance effective enforcement.
• Consistency
38.
One of the main advantages for the creation of an appellate mechanism advanced by its proponents is consistency. Consistency and coherence of jurisprudence create predictability and enhance the legitimacy of the system of investment arbitration. The inconsistent decisions based on the same or similar facts rendered for instance in the CME v Czech Republic 28 and Lauder v Czech Republic 29 cases have attracted widespread attention. While there is no guarantee that the inconsistencies would have been avoided if these awards had been submitted subsequently to an appeal, the chances for consistency would be reinforced by the existence of a common appeals body which would handle not only ICSID awards, but also UNCITRAL awards and awards rendered by ICC, SCC and other ad hoc arbitral tribunals.
39.
The notion of consistency has been viewed to go beyond the situation when two panels constituted under different agreements deal with the same set of facts and give conflicting opinions or reach a different conclusion. It might also encompass coherence of interpretation of basic principles which may underlie differently worded provisions in particular agreements and therefore might enhance the development of a more consistent international investment law. However, it was also pointed out that one needs to approach the question of consistency with some caution and clarity in terms of one's objectives. For example, the discussions in the OECD Investment Committee on the substantive obligations in investment agreements has revealed that countries' intent with respect to the interpretation of a similar provision in their investment agreements may differ in some respects. Thus, the development of consistent international legal principles needs to be balanced by respect for the intent of the parties to specific agreements. Even where the intent of the countries may differ in some respects in relation to similar provisions in their investment agreements, it was argued that, there is value in encouraging consistency in interpretation across the agreements of a particular country or countries where the intent of the parties do not differ. Finally, an appellate mechanism could provide a more uniform and coherent means for challenging awards if traditional bases for annulment were incorporated and it became the exclusive means to challenge an award.
• Rectification of legal errors and possibly serious errors of fact
41.
Another possible advantage is to allay public concern that awards affecting important public policy issues and interests could be enforced despite serious error. This could enhance support for investor-state arbitration at a time of growing numbers of cases.
• Review confined to a neutral tribunal versus national courts
42.
While arbitral awards may not be appealed on the merits under the current arbitration system, the system reserves a limited but real role for national courts in reviewing the non-ICSID awards. There was some concern that, in some instances, national courts are exceeding their authority to review awards, thereby compromising a central advantage of international arbitration.
43.
The creation of an appeal mechanism would uphold the principal advantage of investor-state dispute settlement: the review of investment awards, in particular those outside the ICSID system, i.e. under UNCITRAL and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, would be confined to neutral and qualified tribunals which would operate on the basis of international standards and procedures instead of taking place in domestic courts which may have a local bias or be subject to governmental influences.
• Effective enforcement
44.
Under the current system, for ICSID awards there is a treaty obligation to recognise, which extends to the entire award 30 and an obligation to enforce, 31 which extends only to the pecuniary obligations imposed by the award. The enforcement provision is a distinctive feature of the ICSID Convention. Most other instruments governing international adjudication do not cover enforcement but leave the issue to domestic laws or applicable treaties.
32 Therefore, non-ICSID awards are enforceable under the normal rules governing the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards established by national law, the New York Convention and other relevant treaties, which give the principal role to domestic courts. Under the New York Convention, the national court could refuse to honour an award. "Each Contracting State shall recognise an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and shall enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgement of a court in that State…" 32. NAFTA Article 1136(3)(b) expressly provides for the possibility of actions in national courts to "revise, set aside or annul" awards, requiring the winning party to refrain from enforcement until the losing side has had the opportunity to pursue such relief.
33.
The New York Convention requires contracting states to "recognise arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon". Article V sets out limited grounds on which recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused. See op. cit. paragraphs 12-17.
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45.
In the discussions on creating an appellate mechanism, it was suggested that this might enhance the expeditious and effective enforcement of awards if a respondent that appealed were required to post a bond in the amount of the award and if appeal decisions were excluded from domestic court review.
ii) Disadvantages
46.
The main disadvantages discussed were that an appeal would go against the principle of finality, would bring additional delays, costs and caseload and lead to the politicisation of the system.
• Against the principle of finality 47.
The finality of arbitration proceedings, i.e., that an arbitration award is binding and not open to appeal on the merits, has generally been seen as one of the major advantages of arbitration over judicial settlement. The "final" award puts an end to the parties' conflict and related dispute settlement expenses in a limited period of time.
48.
To the extent the appeal mechanism expands the grounds currently available for annulment or set aside of an award, it would compromise the finality of arbitration. However, there was a view that investment arbitration involves issues of public interest which make the acceptance of the risk of flawed or erroneous decisions less justifiable in the name of finality than it may be in traditional commercial arbitration.
• Additional delays and costs
49.
The existence of an appeal mechanism could result in additional costs and delays in the resolution process. With respect to delays, however, there was a view that there are already considerable delays in the set aside proceedings under the national court systems which given the existence of different layers of appeal (first instance, appeal court, supreme courts), could take years before a final decision is rendered.
50.
It was also proposed that this potential problem could be limited by setting specific time limits in the appellate process.
51.
Another aspect affecting the potential delay and cost of an appeal mechanism was the scope of the review. It was the clear consensus of nearly all the experts that an appeal limited to pure questions of law and excluding review for even serious error of fact would be less potentially costly and time consuming.
• Additional caseload 52. By including additional grounds to the ones under the current annulment and review procedures, an appeal in investment disputes could result in a greater number of challenges to arbitral awards. There was a concern that there would be a tendency to appeal in every case, which would result in decreasing confidence in the main body of decisions and the authority of the "first instance" arbitrators.
53.
On this point, it was argued that it might be possible to negotiate a balance of disincentives to appeal such as the requirement of the deposit of a bond to secure the award or the costs of the proceedings which would discourage routine resort to appeal.
• Politicisation of the system 14 54.
There was a concern that the de-politicisation of investment disputes, considered one of the main achievements of investor-to-state arbitration, could be undermined. There was a view that governments, to please to their constituencies, are likely to appeal on every case they lose in the first instance and they would be the main beneficiaries of the system. In addition, it was argued that if the choice of appellate arbitrators is made by the states only, there is a risk of bias against investors.
55.
However, a number of arguments have been advanced about the benefits investors could draw from the creation of an appeals mechanism. First, statistically investors lose at least as often as governments, so they would have at least the same opportunity to appeal. Second, the posting of a bond would provide a security for the investor of the amount of the award rendered, which, as noted, can be of particular significance for non-ICSID arbitration. Finally, it was proposed that different solutions could be envisaged for the choice of arbitrators so to ensure neutrality of the system.
56.
The review of the advantages and disadvantages produced no consensus among the consultation participants and in the OECD Investment Committee discussions on the merits of adding an appeal to the investor-state dispute settlement system. Considering the ICSID proposal on this matter, its Administrative Council and most of those who offered comments, expressed the view that it would be premature to attempt to establish such an ICSID mechanism at this stage, particularly in view of the difficult technical and policy issues raised. The ICSID Secretariat, will continue however to study such issues to assist member countries when and if it is decided to proceed towards the establishment of an ICSID appeal mechanism. 
57.
Under most rules for investment arbitration, there is no layer of quality control of the award until the final award has been issued and may then be subject to the review procedure -either set aside by national courts or the ICSID Annulment procedure. In the context of international commercial arbitration, the ICC International Court of Arbitration Rules provide for a unique feature of quality control named "scrutiny of awards by the Court". In the investor-state dispute settlement context, a somewhat similar procedure was introduced by the United States in its model BIT and in the investment chapters of its recent FTAs.
A.
The ICC Court of Arbitration Procedure
58.
This mechanism constitutes one of the essential features of ICC arbitration procedure and is appreciated by most ICC arbitration users, including arbitrators. The procedure
60.
The purpose of the scrutiny is to avoid the risk of an ICC award containing a serious formal defect. The Court checks whether the draft award rules on all the claims, includes an operative part, and gives all the reasons for the arbitral tribunal's decisions. 36 
61.
The first step is submission by the Tribunal of a draft award to the Counsel in charge of supervising the arbitration within the Secretariat of the Court. 37 After studying the proposed draft the Counsel discusses some of the points with the president of the arbitral tribunal, who decides whether any changes should be made before the draft award is submitted to the Court. The Counsel then prepares a written report describing the arbitration in general terms and noting any obvious mistakes. The Court designates a Reporter from amongst its Members who is charged with preparing a separate report. This report is submitted, along with the Counsel's report and the draft Award, to one of the Court's weekly Committee Sessions or, when the Awards involve large amounts in dispute, particularly complex or novel legal issues, state parties or dissenting opinions, to the Court's monthly Plenary Sessions. The Court, after discussion, either accepts the award as submitted or decides to return it to the arbitral tribunal requiring modification as to the form and/or drawing the Tribunal's attention to points of substance without affecting the latter's freedom of decision.
62.
Modification as to the form means that the award is approved only after the arbitral tribunal has made the required modifications. No award may be notified to the parties until the arbitral tribunal has made the formal modification laid down by the Court.
63.
The Court does not have the power to require the arbitral tribunal to make changes to the substance of the draft award 38 but it may draw the tribunal's attention to "points of substance". For instance, it may draw its attention to the fact that an award contains reasons which contradict each other and could make it partly incomprehensible. The Court could also point out that the tribunal has ruled "ultra petita" i.e., it has decided on a point that did not form part of the claims or awarded amounts above those requested. It may further draw the arbitral tribunal's attention to compulsory statutes of limitation in a given country which may affect the enforcement of the award. The arbitral tribunal is free to ignore the Court's comments and the Court may not refuse to approve the draft award on this basis. 
38.
Article 27 of the Rules.
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64. The scrutiny process is designed to take approximately two weeks from the date the Secretariat receives the draft award. This time can vary depending on whether the draft award needs to be translated, whether it is to be submitted to a Committee or to Plenary Session, the condition of the draft and the responsiveness of the arbitral tribunal in making any requested changes.
Its application to investment arbitration
65.
Although the International Court of Arbitration sees some investor-state disputes, these do not constitute the majority of its load. The question is whether it would be desirable to try to apply this system of scrutiny to a greater number of investment arbitration cases which fall mainly under ICSID and to a lesser extent to other arbitration institutions. It will not apply to ad hoc arbitration since scrutiny needs an institution.
66.
As practiced in ICC, scrutiny requires an experienced and well-trained Secretariat and an independent, permanent judicial body -to mirror the Court of Arbitration. ICSID has an experienced Secretariat but lacks the judicial body to carry the scrutiny process forward. Any establishment of such a body would likely require the amendment of a set of ICSID Rules (Arbitration or Administrative Rules) and subsequently approval by the Administrative Council.
67.
Although the OECD Investment Committee valued the merits of the procedure in the context of the ICC arbitration, considered that applying scrutiny to investment arbitration would require an important systemic change which was neither feasible nor justified under the circumstances.
B.
The review of/ or comments by the disputing parties on draft awards 
II. MULTIPLE AND PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS -CONSOLIDATION OF CLAIMS
69.
As a result of the larger number of BITs currently in place, and the increasing globalisation of production and investment, investors seeking to pursue claims for damages often have a choice of fora, i.e. either of different arbitration regimes or of arbitration or a national court. Corporations are reported to begin structuring their transactions in such a way as to be able to benefit from the provisions of different BITs. The "Czech cases", (CME/Lauder v. the Czech Republic) and the approximately 40 cases currently pending against Argentina and arising from the same events demonstrate the increasing complexity of fora decisions.
70.
Investors are sometimes able to claim breaches of different BITs and to seek relief through different arbitration proceedings under each of the invoked treaties in respect of a single investment and regarding the same facts, which could lead to parallel proceedings and potentially conflicting awards. This result is due to the fact that many, if not most BITS, protect not only investments made by nationals, individual and corporations of one state directly into the other state, but also investments made indirectly through a company established in one party but controlled by an investor in a non-party. Investors who are minority shareholders may be able to bring claims, too. A particular company may have minority shareholders of various nationalities. Hence, the host state may face multiple arbitrations under different BITs in relation to essentially the same set of facts. This section looks at issues related to forum shopping and multiple and parallel proceedings and at the consolidation of claims as a proposed avenue for the avoidance of possible inconsistent and conflicting awards emanating from the multiplicity of proceedings.
II.1.
Multiple proceedings
71.
The most striking example of multiple proceedings emanating from the same single set of events by one government is the number of cases brought to ICSID against Argentina. There are approximately 40 ICSID proceedings today against Argentina. The vast majority were initiated in the months following the December 2001 devaluation of the Argentine peso. At that time, by a set of laws and decrees related to what Argentina has described as a public economic emergency and by amendment of the exchange rate system, Argentina ended the regime of convertibility and parity of the Argentine peso with the US dollar which had been in effect since 1991. The majority of the proceedings concern utilities and related service sectors (e.g. water, gas and energy distribution, telephone companies) and extractive industries sector (oil concessions). In the first award rendered CMS Gas 72.
All the ICISD proceedings involving Argentina have been initiated on the basis of BITs concluded in the 1990s mainly with G7 countries but also with countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. There is a legitimate concern that multiple cases brought against a single country based on a single measure could be a major source of inconsistent awards.
73.
In recent arbitration cases a broad notion has been emerging of what constitutes an "investor" and "investment". Foreign corporations frequently establish local ventures as indirect subsidiaries, incorporated in the Host state and held in a multi-tier arrangement. The tribunal in CMS v. Argentina 45 was the first to recognise that non-controlling minority shareholdings constitute an "investment" for purposes of the ICSID Convention and most BITs. Given the great number of non-controlling minority shareholders in each company, the risk of multiple proceedings over the same claim based on the same measures, is real.
74.
In the CMS v. Argentina case, the CMS Gas Transition Company ("CMS") purchased shares of an Argentine company, Transportadora de Gas del Norte ("TGN"), pursuant to Argentina's privatization program in 1995. Argentina argued that CMS lacked standing to file its claim because it was merely a minority non-controlling shareholder and thus did not have standing to claim damages suffered by TGN. 46 The Tribunal ruled that the Convention did not require control over a locally-incorporated company in order to qualify under the Convention. It also ruled that the Convention does not bar a claim brought by a minority non-controlling shareholder such as CMS, observing that previous ICSID tribunals in also finding jurisdiction had "not been concerned with the question of majority [ownership] or control but rather whether shareholders can claim independently from the corporate entity". The Tribunal answered this question in the affirmative.
75.
In Lanco v. Argentina, 47 18.3% shareholding was sufficient to find jurisdiction as an investment. The Tribunal noted that there was nothing in the Treaty that required an investor in the capital stock to have either control over the administration of a company, or a majority share, in order to qualify as an investor for the purposes of the Treaty. 48 The Tribunal further noted inter alia that Lanco was liable for all contractual obligations "to the extent of its equity share" and concluded that Lanco was a party to the Agreement "in its own name and right." 
52.
Ibid, para 93.
53.
Idem.
54.
Ibid, para 94. 
II.2. Forum shopping and parallel proceedings
79.
The process throughout which one of the parties to a dispute attempts to bring a claim before the forum most advantageous to him or her is referred to as "forum shopping".
56 Forum shopping has long been a familiar concept in international private law and in many domestic law systems. A particular type of forum shopping can be found in international commercial disputes where parties can choose to pursue litigation before one out of several available jurisdictions. 57, 58 80.
In the case of investment arbitration, "forum shopping" has a different meaning and application. On the one hand, the foreign investor is directed by the investment treaty to a specific arbitration option or set of options, i.e. local courts, ICISD arbitration or ad hoc arbitration. This creates an opportunity for forum shopping very different from the traditional private international law one: a forum shopping facility offered intentionally in favour of the investor. 59 On the other hand, a foreign investor and related parties may engage in forum shopping in combination with treaty shopping, to enlarge the choice of forum beyond the options provided by the specific BIT, or even to bring the same facts into parallel or multiple proceedings. Certain jurisdictions provide that even when the court has jurisdiction to hear a dispute, it may decline jurisdiction if it considers that the authorities of another country are in a better position to decide (forum non conveniens doctrine). The international lis pendens rule also provides that a court may stay its ruling if another action between the same parties, based on the same facts and having the same object, is pending before a foreign authority. 
60.
The MAI Negotiating Group in its consideration of issues arising from the relationship between the MAI and other international agreements, including the WTO agreements, was focused on the avoidance of forum shopping, multiple procedures and contradictory awards. MAI negotiators expressed the view that it would be desirable to minimise forum shopping. The draft articles of the MAI reflected some initial judgements on how to address the issues of choice of forum. A provision was to preserve the MAI Party's right to take to state-to-state arbitration a dispute which was subject to an investor-state proceeding. The text proposed to accept the possibility that a MAI Party might win a state-to-state award finding its measure was not a treaty violation, while it might lose on that point in an investor-state panel and be held to pay damages to the investor. MAI negotiators had treated this as acceptable and had insisted that the state-to-state award did not affect the validity of the investor to state award.
81.
The most graphic examples of this phenomenon are the CME/Lauder v. the Czech Republic cases. 61 In these cases, 62 the Czech Republic was subject to two different UNCITRAL proceedings concerning certain governmental measures with regard to a local company that owned a TV license. The claims were brought almost simultaneously by the ultimate controlling shareholder, a US investor, Lauder, under the US-Czech Republic BIT in London and by a Dutch company, the CME Czech Republic, that hold shares in the local company under the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT in Stockholm. The Czech Republic prevailed against Lauder, but was ordered to pay a substantial compensation to CME.
82.
The Lauder Tribunal acknowledged the potential problem of conflicting awards, noting "that damages [could] be concurrently granted by more than one court or arbitral tribunal…" Nevertheless, it reasoned that "the second deciding court or arbitral tribunal could take this fact into consideration when assessing the final damage". 63 The CME Tribunal addressed the ramifications of the parties' parallel proceedings but found no bar to adjudicating the same dispute: 64 
"The Czech Republic did not agree to consolidate the Treaty proceedings, a request raised by the Claimant (again) during these arbitration proceedings. The Czech government asserted the right to have each action determined independently and promptly. This has the consequence that there will be two awards on the same subject which may be consistent with each other or may differ. Should two different Treaties grant remedies to the respective claimants deriving from the same facts and circumstance, this does not deprive one of the claimants of jurisdiction, if jurisdiction is granted under the respective Treaty. A possible abuse by Mr. Lauder in pursuing his claim under the US Treaty as alleged by the Respondents does not affect jurisdiction in these arbitration proceedings".
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II.3. Consolidation of claims
83.
Consolidation of claims has often been applied in commercial arbitration, subject to the parties' consent. 66 The need for consolidation arises when there are multiple arbitration proceedings filed with common questions of law or fact which raise the possibility of inconsistent or even conflicting awards.
61.
G. Sacerdoti notes that these cases represent the first instance of a major investment dispute arising under BITs being resolved in UNCITRAL arbitration (synonymous to international commercial arbitration). 
22
The Lauder/CME v. the Czech Republic cases might have reached a different result if they had been consolidated; in this case however one of the parties was unwilling to agree to consolidate the claims.
67
A. State practice and international rules
84.
The UNCITRAL Rules, the ICSID Convention, and the Additional Facility Rules, do not have any provision allowing for consolidation of claims. However, there have been some recent cases filed at ICSID in which the parties agreed to have their claims against a particular state consolidated. In order to avoid inconsistencies in the findings of different tribunals, parties could also appoint the same arbitrators. The draft MAI 68 had provided for consolidation of multiple proceedings in its Article 9 of the Chapter of Investor-State Procedures (see Annex).
85.
The first multilateral agreement in force which provided for consolidation of claims was NAFTA. Its Article 1126 provides that where a Tribunal established under this Article is satisfied that claims submitted to arbitration have a question of law or fact in common, the Tribunal may, in the interests of fair and efficient resolution of the claims, and after hearing the disputing parties, order that the Tribunal assume jurisdiction over and hear and determine together, all or part of the claims; or assume jurisdiction over and hear and determine one or more of the claims, the determination of which it believes would assist in the resolution of the others 69 (see Annex). The CME v. Czech Republic Tribunal, in its Final Award ordering the Czech Republic to pay damages, reiterated the respondent's repeated rejection of CME's offer to structure the two cases so as to avoid potentially conflicting arbitral awards:
Since NAFTA, provisions of consolidation have been included in investment chapters of Free
"At the hearing the Respondent declined anew to accept any of the Claimant's alternative proposals…i) to have the two arbitrations consolidated into a single proceeding, ii) to have the same three arbitrators appointed for both proceedings, iii) to accept the Claimant's nomination in this proceeding of the same arbitrator that Mr. Lauder nominated in the London proceeding, iv) to agree that the parties to this arbitration are bound by the London Tribunal's determination as to whether there has been a Treaty breach, v) that after the submission of the parties' respective reply memorials and witness statements in this arbitration, the hearing be postponed until after the issuance of an award in they London
Arbitration". provide for consolidation upon request by a disputing party and not ex officio and concern multiple claims arising from the same facts, usually a state measure alleged to be in breach of the State's obligation.
B. Jurisprudence
88.
As mentioned above, in order to avoid inconsistencies in the findings of different tribunals, parties could also appoint the same arbitrators. This was done in the past, when two or three cases were brought by different investors against the same host State for similar actions taken by that State. 77 The first application of the NAFTA provision on consolidation was the consideration of a request by Mexico for consolidation of three claims by a Tribunal constituted to this effect. 89 Corn Products International, Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate &Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc., three US based companies, had submitted requests for institution of arbitration proceedings to ICSID against Mexico, for alleged breaches of NAFTA arising from the imposition of an excise tax on soft drinks containing high fructose corn syrup. A "Consolidation Tribunal" was constituted to rule upon Mexico's request and decided against this consolidation in its Order of May 20 th , 2005. It held that although there were some common questions of fact and law, there were several reasons to reject the claim: the direct and major competition between the claimants which would require complex confidentiality measures throughout the arbitration process and the numerous distinct issues of state responsibility and quantum.
91.
On 92 agreeing to the request of consolidation after having found that all four conditions of Article 1126(2) of the NAFTA were met. First, the claims in question had been submitted to arbitration under Article 1120; second, many questions of law and fact were common in the three Article 1120 arbitrations; third, the interests of fair and efficient resolution of the claims merit the assumption of jurisdiction over all of the claims; and fourth, the parties to the proceedings had been heard. It disagreed with the statements found in the Corn Products case related to the major competition among the claimants and the respect of confidentiality as the main impediments for such a consolidation.
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92.
Introduction of consolidation provisions in existing BITs although desirable is not a realistic solution because it would require amending or renegotiating many BITs. Consolidation provisions could be envisaged, however, for new BITs coming up for review. In the meantime, disputing parties could take the initiative to ask for consolidation, and arbitral institutions such as ICSID could facilitate the process by appointing the same panel of arbitrators -which has already been done in some of the cases against Argentina. The OECD Investment Committee has agreed to examine further the rationale and merits of consolidation in investment arbitration and to conclude its discussions on this issue with a statement/recommendation on the subject.
III. OTHER CHALLENGES OF JURISDICTIONAL NATURE: TREATY/CONTRACT CLAIMS
93.
BITs establish a legal framework for the treatment and protection of foreign investment and investors and any claims arising from the treaty are treaty claims. Foreign investment also involves contracts between the investor and the host state or entities of the host state, for example in the form of concession contracts. Although the rights of the investor under each instrument are different, sometimes they may overlap. When a State-owned company breaches a contract concluded with a foreign investor -or when the host state breaches the contractual commitments assumed with a company in which a foreign investor has a stake, investors may have both contract and treaty claims against the host state. This has an impact on determinations of jurisdiction.
94.
BITs define the parameters for the activities of tribunals in investor-state arbitration. Jurisdiction may be subject to certain procedural requirements: for instance, the competence of arbitral tribunals may depend on proceedings in the host state's domestic courts. The subject-matter jurisdiction of tribunals also varies, and may be described narrowly or more broadly: it may be limited to claims alleging a violation of BITs or it may include all investment disputes arising out of contracts.
95.
In recent disputes, contract claims have been submitted to investment arbitration, through a BIT, even in the absence of a contractual clause providing for ICSID jurisdiction. This raises a number of questions: to what extent may an investor rely on treaty based protections under a BIT, but arising from contracts containing exclusive jurisdiction clauses in favour of a national court? Can the breach of a contractual provision amount to a breach of international law rights? How should tribunals apply the socalled "umbrella clauses" contained in some BITs, in which States promise to comply with all commitments and undertakings? These issues have been considered by a number of ICSID tribunals in recent times but without much uniformity in their approach.
III.1.
Treaty jurisdiction despite the existence of a jurisdiction clause in a contractual agreement
96.
The most direct precedents for allowing the investor to refer a contract dispute to an arbitral tribunal on the basis of a treaty despite the existence of a separate dispute settlement clause in the contract are the decisions on 
97.
In Lanco v. Argentina, 93 the tribunal held that the exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of national courts did not prevent the submission of disputes to ICSID on two main grounds. The reasons were that, first, the wording of Art.26 of the Washington Convention is such that consent to ICSID arbitration is "to the exclusion of any other remedy" and second, since administrative jurisdiction cannot be selected by mutual agreement, the weight to be accorded to the contractual choice which the parties had made ought to be diminished. The complexities of treaty/contract claims are very well illustrated in the Vivendi arbitration.
96,97. The choice of forum was also examined in an indirect way by the ICSID Ad hoc Committee in Vivendi v. Argentina (Annulment procedure). 98 The Committee faced with an exclusive jurisdiction clause and a BIT, distinguished between claims based on a breach of contract and claims based on a breach of a treaty. It concluded that BITs "set an independent standard" from that contained in contracts and a State could breach a treaty without breaching a contract and vice versa. Where the "essential basis" of a claim was contractual, then the exclusive jurisdiction clause would apply; when the claim were based on the breach of a treaty standard, then the jurisdictional provisions of the BIT could be invoked: 100.
In the Sempra Energy International v. Argentina case, 101 the Tribunal reviewed previous decisions which have dealt with this issue, in particular the one on annulment in Vivendi and concluded that it would not depart from the approach that "the claim is accordingly founded on both the contract and the Treaty, independently of the fact that purely contractual questions having no effect on the provisions of the Treaty can be subject to legal action available under the domestic law of the Argentine Republic". 
102.
Idem para 101.
Box 1. Fork in the Road
BITs contain different provisions as for the relationship between international arbitration and domestic courts. Some BITs allow the investor to submit a dispute to arbitration after the dispute has been before the local courts or administrative tribunals for some fixed period of time, even if local courts have not concluded their proceedings 1 . Other BITs allow international arbitration provided no decision has been taken by domestic courts. The clear distinction between contract and treaty claims in order to determine the two types of litigation available for the same investment has an implication on the conditions of application of the "fork-in-the road" clause. These clauses aim at making irrevocable the choice of the investor who would have otherwise a generous choice of jurisdictions.
2 Not all investment agreements contain such a clause.
Investors are often involved in legal disputes which are of commercial or private law nature and may need to appear before a domestic court or an administrative tribunal. While these disputes may relate somehow to the investment, they are not "identical" to the investment dispute. This recourse to domestic courts does not necessarily reflect a choice which would preclude international arbitration. The emerging case law 3 related to the application of the "fork-in-the road" provision, is fairly consistent. This provision and the loss of access to international arbitration applies only if the same dispute between the same parties has been submitted to domestic courts or administrative tribunals of the host state before the resort to international arbitration. 12. "An investor may seek interim relief, not involving the payment of damages, from the judicial or administrative tribunals of a Contracting Party, for the preservation of its rights and interests pending resolution of the dispute, without being deemed, thereby, to have submitted the dispute for resolution for purposes of subparagraph 4(b)"DAFFE/MAI/EG1(96)12 "Settlement of disputes between an investor and a contracting party".
101.
In AES Corporation v. The Argentine Republic 103 the Tribunal was confronted with the same argument raised by Argentina and concurred with the position discussed above, already adopted by previous tribunals. The Tribunal distinguished between "two distinct legal orders: the international and the national one." It held that exclusive jurisdiction of the national forum arose only within the Argentinean legal order and in relation to the execution of the contract but this did not preclude a claimant asserting its rights under two international treaties, the US-Argentina BIT and the ICSID Convention. To the extent that breaches of the concession contract also amounted to violations of Argentina's international obligations under the BIT, the Tribunal could assert jurisdiction over these claims.
102.
In Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, 104 Poland contended that Eureko's claims were inadmissible since they were predicated upon contractual claims. It relied on the terms of the DutchPoland BIT which provided that disputes concerning the BIT would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of a "Polish public court competent with respect to the Seller." Referring, inter alia, to the decision of the ad hoc Committee in the Vivendi annulment decision, Poland also submitted that international law requires that the extent of the State's contractual obligations must first be determined by the forum selected in the contract before a tribunal constituted pursuant to an investment treaty can consider whether the State breached its treaty obligations. The tribunal noted that the Vivendi annulment tribunal held that where "the fundamental basis of the claim' is the treaty laying down an independent standard by which the conduct of the parties may be judged, the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract between the claimant and the respondent state…cannot operate as a bar to the application of the treaty standard. At most, it might be relevant…in assessing whether there has been a breach of the treaty." 105 The tribunal found that the principle underlying the decision of the ad hoc committee in Vivendi required it to consider whether the facts of this case constituted breaches of the BIT.
III.2.
The umbrella clause
103.
The extent of jurisdiction rationae materiae (subject matter) is not uniform under BITs. Some BITS cover only disputes relating to an "obligation under this agreement", i.e. only for claims of BIT violations. Others extend the jurisdiction to "any dispute relating to investments". The latter clause 106 creates an international law obligation that a host state shall, for example, "observe any obligation it may Eureko contended that as a result of its investment in PZU, it acquired rights that were entitled to protection by the Republic of Poland pursuant to the BIT, and such rights were frustrated by measures attributable to the Republic of Poland.
105.
106.
The clause often appears in BITs concluded by Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the US (based on previous models). Source UNCTAD "Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s", 1998, p. 56.
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have entered to"; "constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered into"; "observe any obligation it has assumed", and other formulations. These provisions are commonly called "umbrella clauses", 107 although other formulations have also been used: "mirror effect", "elevator", "parallel effect", "sanctity of contract" and "pacta sunt servanda". Clauses of this kind have been added to provide additional protection to investors and are directed at covering investment agreements (including contracts) that host countries frequently conclude with foreign investors. Until the recent jurisprudence on the interpretation of the umbrella clause in the two SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA cases, there seemed to exist a settled opinion on its meaning and scope. For a better understanding of the clause, a brief overview of its history as well as its interpretation by scholars and arbitral tribunals is necessary.
a)
History of the clause and investment agreements 
107.
The clause was also one of the core substantive rules of the 1967 OECD draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property (Article 2) 111 which provided that:
107. According to C. Schreuer, "they are often referred to as 'umbrella clauses' because they put contractual commitments under the BIT's protective umbrella", in "Travelling the BIT 
108.
The Notes and Commentaries accompanying the draft Convention describe this article as "an application of the general principle of pacta sunt servanda" in favour of the property of nationals of another party, and their lawful successors in title unless the undertaking expressly excludes such succession". According to the Commentaries, "property" included but is not limited to investments which are defined in Article 9 as "all property, rights and interests whether held directly or indirectly, including the interest which a member of a company is deemed to have in the property of the company". Property is to be understood "in the widest sense". 112 However, the commentary limits the scope of Article 2 by insisting that undertakings "must relate to the property concerned; it is not sufficient if the link is incidental". 
110.
The draft MAI text provided -in the Annex, listing negotiating proposals by two delegations, two formulations for a "respect clause": 
115.
The MAI Drafting Group considered the question of provisions which might be included in the MAI on investor rights arising from other agreements. Three broad conceptual approaches emerged. These were, in ascending order of ambition: (i) a "zero" option, i.e., no special provision in the MAI on rights under investor-state agreements; (ii) a procedural provision, i.e., a dispute settlement clause; or (iii) a substantive and procedural provision, i.e., a "respect clause". The third approach was considered the most ambitious. It would make respect for such investor-state agreements into a MAI obligation, giving them substantive protection of the international law rule, pacta sunt servanda. Arguably, this could affect the defences of or damages owed by a government asserting rights to cancel or modify a contract for sovereign reasons or to change laws affecting an investment. It also has the following essential procedural effect: violations of the investor-state agreement would be subject to the full range of MAI dispute settlement mechanisms, including state-state consultations and arbitration. In such settlement, the issues would be considered in a broad context including both domestic and international law. The MAI Drafting Group considered that: "the second and third approaches would, in effect, amend investor-state agreements. They could introduce uncertainties about the law and remedies to be applied in case of dispute. They raise the questions of whether and how to draw a line between the kinds of agreements for 
112.
The understanding of commentators and drafters on the umbrella clause provision in the draft OECD Convention was that while the clause probably did cover international obligations, its focus was contractual obligations accepted by the host state with regard to foreign property. 118 
113.
Commenting on the same provision, Brower, 119 raised the possibility that the article's scope rationae materiae may have been limited so as only "to apply specifically to large-scale investment and which the additional protection might be appropriate and those for which it might not, such as purely commercial bargains, or agreements settling tax or other administrative claims". There was no consensus in the Group on the basic choice of approach. That choice may also be affected by outcome on a provision stating that the more favourable of the MAI or those investor-state agreements prevailed. If a decision is taken to pursue either the second (procedural) or third (substantive and procedural) approach, there would be subsidiary questions, the most important being scope of coverage. Should the provision apply broadly to all investor rights under investor-state agreements? If not, should it be limited by, for example, distinguishing between rights arising under essentially commercial agreements (presumably excluded) and those under which a state is acting as a sovereign (presumably covered) -a distinction which may be difficult to make in practice; or enumerating or defining categories of covered rights, such as those arising out of investment agreements and authorisations on which an investor has relied. The Group examined the strategic choices and issues thoroughly, in the time available, and clarified their implications. Given the range of views, the Group did not elaborate draft provisions for inclusion in the MAI. However, it agreed to provide the above mentioned provisions to aid in understanding the basic choices. These texts were not examined by the Group and did not represent specific recommendations. concession contracts -in the making of which the state is deliberately 'exercising its sovereignty'-and thus it might be argued that the ordinary commercial contracts is an implied exception to the general rule set forth in Article 2". 120 114. Today, it seems that a more consistent view emerges among commentators on the scope of the umbrella clause. Prosper Weil presented in his Hague lecture the idea that an investment treaty would transform a mere contractual obligation between state and investor into an international law obligation, in particular if the treaty included a clause obliging the state to respect such contract. 121 
115.
F. Mann also was of the view that the umbrella clause in the BITS protects the investor against a mere breach of contract: "this is a provision of particular importance in that it protects the investor against any interference with his contractual rights, whether it results from a mere breach of contract or a legislative or administrative act, and independently of the question whether or no such interference amounts to expropriation. The variation of the terms of a contract or license by legislative measures, the termination of the contract or the failure to perform any of its terms, for instance, by non-payment, the dissolution of the local company with which the investor may have contracted and the transfer of its assets (with or without the liabilities) -these and similar acts the treaties render wrongful". 122 
116.
Dolzer and Stevens along the same lines state that: "these provisions seek to ensure that each Party to the treaty will respect specific undertakings towards nationals of the other Party. The provision is of particular importance because it protects the investor's contractual rights against any interference which might be caused by either a simple breach of contract or by administrative or legislative acts and because it is not entirely clear under general international law whether such measures constitute breaches of an international obligation". 
117.
E. Gaillard notes that every time the State is engaged by a treaty to respect its contractual obligations towards foreign investors, the violation of the contract is also a violation of the treaty. These clauses could be qualified as "clauses with a mirror effect". The treaty has in effect as a result to reflect 120 .
Wälde notes that contracts related to investment -at this time seen in a much more narrow way as "foreign direct investment" than today -did by their very nature always involve a governmental dimension. Treaties at this time also only provided for state-to-state arbitration which was a screening mechanism against exorbitant and gratuitous use of treaties by private commercial operators. 121. « Il y a en effet, pas de difficultés particulières [en ce qui concerne la mise en jeu de la responsabilité contractuelle de l'Etat] lorsqu' il existe entre l'Etat contractant et l'Etat national du co-contractant un traité de ''couverture'' qui fait de l'obligation d'exécuter le contrat une obligation internationale à la charge de l'Etat contractant envers l'Etat national du cocontractant. L'intervention du traité de couverture transforme les obligations contractuelles en obligations internationales et assure ainsi, comme on l'a dit, ''l'intangibilité du contrat sous peine de violer le traité''; toute inexécution du contrat, seraitelle même régulière au regard du droit interne de l'Etat contractant, engage dès lors la responsabilité internationale de ce dernier envers l'Etat national du cocontractant » UNCTAD's 125 analysis of the provision is less categorical. It notes that "the language of the provision is so broad that it could be interpreted to cover all kinds of obligations, explicit or implied, contractual or non-contractual, undertaken with respect to investment generally. A provision of this kind might possibly alter the legal regime and make the agreement subject to the rules of international law".
119.
A middle approach is expressed by T. Wälde. He believes that the principle of international law would only protect breaches and interference with contracts made with government or subject to government powers, if the government exercised it particular sovereign prerogatives to escape from its contractual commitments or to interfere in a substantial way with such commitments. This would apply as well to contracts concluded only with private parties in the host state if such contracts are destroyed by government powers. "…If the core or centre of gravity of a dispute is not about the exercise of governmental powers ...but about "normal" contract disputes, then the BIT and the umbrella clause has no role". 126 
120.
A different view is expressed by P. Mayer, who maintains that the nature of the inter pares relationship remains unchanged and is subject to the lex contractus and that only the interstate relationship is subject to international law. 
121.
Although the umbrella clause has been a subject of scholarly discussion for some decades now, it has never been part of jurisprudence until very recently. The first ICSID case that addressed the umbrella clause arose in 1998: Fedax NV v. Republic of Venezuela 128 based on the BIT between the Netherlands and the Republic of Venezuela). In this case, the tribunal was unaware that there was an umbrella clause, and did not carry out any in-depth examination of the clause or its application. It simply applied its "plain meaning", that commitments should be observed under the BIT, to the promissory note contractual document. It found that Venezuela was under the obligation to "honor precisely the terms and conditions governing such investment, laid down mainly in Article 3 of the Agreement, as well as to honor the specific payments established in the promissory notes issued". 129 The merits of the case were partially settled by the parties.
122.
The first time 130 130. The first Energy Charter Treaty tribunal in Nycomb v. Latvia could have rendered its judgment on the basis of the ECT umbrella clause as was proposed by the claimant, but preferred to rest its decision on national treatment. By doing so, it avoided having to decide whether, in this case, the contract's jurisdictional clause in favour of domestic courts should be overridden by the ECT's arbitral jurisdiction. The existence and the potential scope of the clause was also addressed in Salini Construttori S.P.A. and
